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COMMENTS
Mitigating Evidence After Deere: Will a Defendant
Proceeding In Propria Persona Be Required to
Present Mitigating Evidence During the Penalty
Phase of a Capital Trial?
INTRODUCTION
Presently, thirty-seven states have enacted death penalty stat-
utes.' Cases carrying a potential death penalty are tried in two
separate phases. First, the defendant's guilt is determined. The de-
fendant may plead guilty, or the trier of fact may find the defend-
ant guilty of first degree murder.' Then, the determination as to
whether to impose the death penalty is made during a separate
penalty phase. During the penalty phase the court may consider
any matter relevant to aggravation or mitigation.'
Let us suppose that a suspect is charged with committing multi-
ple murders of a particularly heinous nature. Further suppose that
he waives his right to counsel and elects to represent himself dur-
ing both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial." The trial judge
1. Those states with death penalty statutes are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1 - 190.5 (Deering 1985 & Supp. 1986); Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Deering 1985) provides in pertinent part:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explosive,
knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor,
poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and pre-
meditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to per-
petrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem .... is murder of the first degree.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1985) provides in pertinent part: "In the
proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and
the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence including,
but not limited to. .. the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and
physical condition." See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
4. This has occurred in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi,
Nevada and South Carolina. Like California, these states have legislation which provides
for an automatic appeal of a sentence of death. Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40 - 13A-
5-53 (1975 & Supp. 1986); Arizona, ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 - 13-1105 (1956 &
Supp. 1986); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1986); Illinois, ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1986); Maryland, ANN. CODE OF MD.
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appoints standby counsel to aid the defendant. The defendant does
not enlist the aid of standby counsel and presents no evidence at
the guilt phase of his trial.5
Subsequently, the defendant is found guilty of first degree mur-
der. During the penalty phase, he presents no evidence in mitiga-
tion of his guilt. He addresses the court and expresses remorse for
his crimes and states that he deserves to die. His standby counsel
urges him to present available mitigating evidence during the pen-
alty phase, but the defendant decides not to do so. This could be a
tactical decision on the part of the defendant or perhaps the de-
fendant just wants to die. Either way, when this scenario, or one
very much like it, occurs in California, what will be the likely
result?
In California, every capital case must be reviewed by the su-
preme court and no death penalty judgment may be imposed un-
less that court affirms the sentence.' The appeal is taken automat-
ically, without any action on the part of the defendant or his
counsel,7 and the defendant may not waive this appeal." The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has held that the failure of counsel to pre-
sent mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of a capital trial,
without adequate investigation, deprives a defendant of effective
assistance of counsel.' Defense counsel may choose not to present
any mitigating evidence but that choice must be the result of an
informed, tactical decision, within the range of reasonable compe-
tence, even if that decision is made in conjunction with the de-
fendant's instruction not to present any such evidence.10 In People
§§ 99-19-101 - 99-19-105 (1973 & Supp. 1986); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 177.055 -
177.552 (1985); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 - 16-3-25 (Law. Co-op, 1985).
5. A defendant proceeding in propria persona may not plead guilty to a crime
which carries a potential death penalty. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (Deering 1983). This
section provides in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise provided by law every plea must be entered or withdrawn by the
defendant himself in open court. No plea of guilty of a felony for which the maxi-
mum punishment is death, or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
shall be received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, nor shall
any such plea be received without the consent of the defendant's counsel.
6. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 11 provides that the Supreme Court has appellate juris-
diction when judgment of death has been pronounced.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239 (b) (1982).
8. People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1969).
Here, the court held that a defendant could not waive his right to the automatic review of
his penalty determination. The court reasoned that this right was not one conferred upon
the defendant for his sole personal benefit, and that while a "defendant may waive rights
which exist for his own benefit, he may not waive those which belong also to the public
generally." Id. at 834, 457 P.2d at 898-99, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 58-59.
9. People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 164-67, 599 P.2d 587, 599-601, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 292-94 (1979).
10. People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 120-22 (1987).
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v. Deere,"' the court announced that defense counsels' compliance
with defendant's order not to present mitigating evidence during
the penalty phase of a capital trial mandated reversal.1 2 In Deere,
the evidence was withheld at the request of the defendant and not
as a result of a tactical decision by counsel.11
While the court decided Deere on the basis of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel,14 the reasoning used could be extended to a case
where the defendant is proceeding in pro per,'5 or pro per with
standby counsel. In such a case, the issue then becomes whether
the interest of the state in determining the propriety of the death
penalty should take precedence over the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to self-representation."
This Comment focuses on the conflict between the interest of
the state and the rights of the individual demonstrated in Deere.
First, the Comment defines the interest of the state in the penalty
phase of a capital trial. Part II discusses and contrasts the state
interest with the individual's right to self-representation, and con-
cludes which should prevail. Finally, this Comment offers a solu-
tion which protects the individual right to self-representation and
still provides the court with a means to determine the appropriate-
ness of the death penalty.
I. THE STATE INTEREST
The California Supreme Court must examine the complete rec-
ord17 of any case on automatic appeal of a death judgment 8 in
order to determine the propriety of the penalty. The automatic
review upon judgment of death is taken for two reasons: first, to
safeguard the rights of those upon whom the death penalty is im-
11. 4 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1985).
12. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 368, 710 P.2d at 934, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
13. Id. at 364, n.3, 710 P.2d at 931, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
14. Deere, at 364, 710 P.2d at 931, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20. This Comment will not
address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. For a discussion of this issue see
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (1983).
15. The term in propria persona means in one's own proper person. Also referred to
as 'pro per' and 'pro se' it is a term of art used when referring to one who represents
himself. BLACK'S LAW DiCTiONARY 712, 1099 (5th ed. 1979).
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. This amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all crim-
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense." The right to self-representation is implied in this amendment. Faretta v. Cali-
fornia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
17. People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 833, 457 P.2d 889, 898, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49,
58 (1969).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (1982).
1988]
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posed;19 and second, because society needs to be able to rely upon
the determination that death is an appropriate punishment. This
public interest in assuring that the adversary system functions
properly was addressed by the California Supreme Court when it
held that a defendant who wants to plead guilty in a capital case
must be represented by counsel who consents to this plea. 0
In Deere,2 the defendant originally pleaded not guilty, but later
withdrew his plea and pleaded guilty to each count of murder.22
In addition, the defendant admitted the truth of the multiple-mur-
der special circumstance allegation. 3 The defendant waived a jury
trial and the court found him guilty of one count of first degree
murder and two counts of second degree murder.24
The defendant also waived a jury trial on the penalty issue 25
and insisted that no mitigating evidence be presented at the pen-
alty phase .2 Although defense counsel realized that some mitigat-
ing evidence could have been presented in the form of testimony
from the defendant's family regarding the good things he had
done in his life, the defendant insisted that this not be presented.
The defendant argued that the presentation of this evidence
"would cheapen his relationship with his family and remove the
last vestige of dignity he ha[d]. ' 28
Counsel for the defendant addressed the court and explained
why he agreed to forego presenting mitigating evidence. He said
that he argued with defendant over this issue, but finally came to
appreciate and agree with the defendant's point of view. Defense
counsel thereupon argued to the court that the record supported
19. People v. Bob, 29 Cal. 2d 321, 175 P.2d 12 (1946).
20. People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1981).
Here, the court noted that the statutory language of CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 was unam-
biguous, and held that a capital defendant may not plead guilty against the advice of his
attorney. In addition, a defendant may not discharge his attorney, proceed pro per, and
plead guilty. The court explained that section 1018 was "an integral part of the Legisla-
ture's extensive revision of the death penalty laws in response to the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) ... to eliminate the
arbitrariness that Furman found inherent in the operation of prior death penalty legisla-
tion." Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d at 750, 621 P.2d at 843, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 804. The court in
Chadd went on to explain that requiring counsel's consent to guilty pleas in capital cases
serves as a further independent safeguard against erroneous imposition of a death sentence.
Id. See also Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980); People v. Massie, 40 Cal. 3d
620, 709 P.2d 1309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1985).
21. 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1985).
22. Id. at 357, 710 P.2d at 926, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 370-71, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
27. Id. at 361, 710 P.2d at 929, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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only a penalty of life without possibility of parole, and moved the
court to modify its penalty decision.30
The court sentenced the defendant to death.31 On appeal,32 the
California Supreme Court reversed as to the penalty and affirmed
in all other respects.33 The court reasoned that to allow a capital
defendant to prevent the introduction of mitigating evidence on
his behalf "withholds from the trier of fact potentially crucial in-
formation bearing on the penalty decision no less than if the de-
fendant was himself prevented from introducing such evidence by
statute or judicial ruling. In either case the state's interest in a
reliable penalty determination is defeated."3 4
The court further noted that the state has a strong interest in
reducing the risk of mistaken judgments in a capital case and that
without mitigating evidence, a significant portion of the evidence
of the propriety of the penalty is missing.3 5 Also, to permit a de-
fendant to bar his counsel from introducing mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase because the defendant wants to die would vio-
late the fundamental public policy against misusing the judicial
system to commit a state aided suicide. 6 Thus, when the state,
acting to ensure its interest in preventing a state aided suicide,
requires a pro per defendant to present mitigating evidence in the
penalty phase of his trial, even where the defendant does not want
to present such evidence, the interest of the state directly conflicts
with the individual's right to self-representation.
30. Id. at 371, 710 P.2d at 936, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e)
provides that:
In every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or finding imposing
the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have made an application for
modification of such verdict or finding pursuant to Subdivision 7 of Section 11. In
ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into
account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred
to in Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's find-
ings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on
the record the reasons for his findings. The judge shall set forth the reasons for his
ruling on the application and direct that they be entered on the Clerk's minutes.
The denial of the modification of the death penalty verdict pursuant to subdivision
(7) of Section 1181 shall be reviewed on the defendant's automatic appeal pursu-
ant to subdivision (b) of Section 1239.
31. 41 Cal. 3d at 357, 710 P.2d at 926, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
32. CAL PENAL CODE § 1239(b).
33. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 369, 710 P.2d at 934, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
34. Id. at 364, 710 P.2d at 931, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
35. Id. at 363, 710 P.2d at 930, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
36. Id.
19881
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II. THE RIGHT TO SELF REPRESENTATION
In Faretta v. California,3 7 the United States Supreme Court
held that the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution permit a criminal defendant to waive the right
to counsel.38 A state may not constitutionally force a lawyer on a
defendant who insists on his right of self representation. 9 The
Court reasoned that to allow a state to do so would be contrary to
the defendant's basic right to defend himself.4" Faretta concluded
that unless the accused agreed to representation by counsel, "the
defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Con-
stitution, for in a very real sense, it is not his defense."41 Thus,
under Faretta, a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitu-
tional right to proceed without counsel when the defendant volun-
tarily and intelligently elects to do so.42
The holding in Faretta was based on the language, structure
and spirit of the sixth amendment.43 The defendant must be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation,44 and there is
an implied right that the defendant be allowed to conduct his own
defense at what is "his, not counsel's trial. '45
In People v. Joseph,46 the defendant's timely motion to proceed
in propria persona was denied because the charges carried a pos-
sible death penalty. The trial court appointed an attorney for the
remainder of the proceeding, reasoning that the defendant was not
able to effectively represent himself due to the nature of the
charge.47 The defendant subsequently was convicted and sen-
37. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
38. In Faretta, the Court likened defense counsel to a tool which is provided as an
aid to a willing defendant. The Court reasoned that when a defendant chooses to have a
lawyer represent him, law and tradition allocate to counsel the power to make binding
decisions of trial strategy. Id. at 821. This allocation is only justified when the defendant
consents at the outset to accept counsel as his representative. Id. The Court noted that a
defendant who exercises his right to self-representation must comply with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law, and if the defendant deliberately engages in serious and
obstructionist misconduct, the trial judge may terminate the defendant's self-representa-
tion. Id. at 834.
39. Id. at 817.
40. Id. at 807.
41. Id. at 821.
42. Id. at 835. Faretta requires that a defendant makes a knowing and intelligent
decision before he will be allowed to represent himself. This does not mean that he be able
to conduct his defense as well as appointed counsel would. By knowing and intelligent, the
Court means that the defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-represen-
tation "so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is
made with eyes open." Id. at 835.
43. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984).
44. Id. at 174.
45. Id.
46. 34 Cal. 3d 936, 671 P.2d 843, 196 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1983).
47. Id. at 942, 671 P.2d at 848, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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tenced to death. 8
However, on appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed,
holding that once a defendant voluntarily and intelligently proffers
a timely motion to represent himself, "the trial court must permit
an accused to represent himself without regard to the apparent
lack of wisdom of such a choice and even though the accused may
conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment. ' 49 The
court further held that the erroneous denial of a timely Faretta
motion is reversible error per se.50
In Joseph, the Court reasoned that the primary motivation for
allowing a defendant to proceed pro per is respect for the ac-
cused's freedom of choice to personally conduct his own defense as
he sees fit.51 The right to proceed pro per "is designed to safe-
guard the dignity and autonomy of those whose circumstances or
activities have thrust them involuntarily into the criminal pro-
cess."52 Joseph held that the nature of the charge is irrelevant to
the decision to grant or deny a timely Faretta motion, even when
the punishment may be death. 3
III. PENALTY PHASE Pro Per REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL
CASES
Section 987(b) of the California Penal Code provides that in a
capital case, the defendant must be represented by counsel at all
stages of the preliminary and trial proceedings. This statute does
not, however, mean that counsel must be forced on an unwilling
defendant. This issue was addressed in Thomas v. Superior
48. Id. at 936, 671 P.2d at 844, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
49. Id. at 943, 671 P.2d at 845-46, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43. Joseph holds that the
only determination a trial court must make when presented with a timely Faretta motion is
whether the defendant "has the mental capacity to waive his constitutional right to counsel
with a realization of the probable risks and consequences of his action." Id.
50. Id. at 948, 671 P.2d at 850, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
51. Id. at 946, 671 P.2d at 848, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
52. Id. at 946, 671 P.2d at 849, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (quoting United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (1972)). See also Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d
886, 891-92 (1977).
53. Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d at 945, 671 P.2d at 848, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 344. See also
People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979). In Teron, the
court held that no valid death penalty statute applied to the defendant's 1975 crime. Thus,
it did not decide whether the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to proceed pro per
in the penalty determination. However, the court did note that "The trial court's decision
to permit defendant to represent himself in the special circumstanced and penalty phases
presents additional considerations not present at the guilt phase." Id. at 115 n.7, 588 P.2d
at 779, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The court then noted its interest in the accuracy of the
penalty determination, citing People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 49 (1969). It is this interest which conflicts with the individual's right to self-
representation.
1988]
7
Williams: Mitigating Evidence After Deere: Will a Defendant Proceeding In P
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Court.54 There, the court noted that statutes and case law which
required representation in capital cases were superseded by
Faretta,55 and held that a defendant accused of a capital offense
has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he vol-
untarily and intelligently elects to do so.5" So long as the defend-
ant is fully aware of the probable risks and consequences of his
action 57 the trial court must allow him to proceed pro per.58
Defendants who proceed pro per in capital cases raise complex
issues involving how and when counsel may participate. Both the
federal and California courts have endorsed the appointment of
advisory counsel to advise and aid defendants who proceed pro
per. In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania," Chief Justice Burger in a
concurring opinion praised "the wisdom of the trial judge in hav-
ing counsel remain in the case even in the limited role of a con-
sultant."60 Even in Faretta, the Court noted that a state may
"even over objection by the accused - appoint a 'standby counsel'
to aid the accused if he should change his mind and request
assistance." 61
The Supreme Court has held that the pro per defendant must
be allowed to control the organization and content of his de-
fense.6 2 The very core of the Faretta right is the pro per defend-
ant's actual control over the case he chooses to present.63 If
standby counsel substantially interferes with any significant tacti-
cal decisions made by the defendant, the Faretta right is eroded. 64
54. 54 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 126 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976).
55. Id. at 1057, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
56. Id. at 1058, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
57. Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d at 945, 671 P.2d at 848, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
58. Id.
59. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
60. Id. at 467. The California Supreme Court has also addressed this issue. Re-
cently, it held that when a defendant proceeding pro per requests advisory counsel, it is
reversible error per se for a trial court to fail to conscientiously exercise judicial discretion
on the appointment of such advisory counsel. People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d
994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984).
A defendant who asserts the sixth amendment right to self-representation may later
change his mind. At some point in the proceedings, the defendant may suddenly realize
that he is incapable of presenting an adequate defense. He may then want to have counsel
appointed for him who will pick up the gauntlet and take over his defense.
61. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 835, n.46 (1975).
62. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
63. Id.
64. Id. The Court noted that there is no significant interference with the defendant's
actual control over the presentation of his defense when standby counsel is appointed - even
over the defendant's objection - to ensure the defendant's compliance with the basic rules
of courtroom protocol and procedure. Id. at 184-85. However, "[i]f standby counsel's par-
ticipation over the defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially
interfere with any significant tactical decision, or to control the questioning of witnesses, or
to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is
eroded." Id. at 178.
[Vol. 24
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The penalty phase of a capital case, like the guilt phase, is an
adversary proceeding where evidence may be presented by both
the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggra-
vation, mitigation, and sentence.6 5 At the conclusion of this phase,
the trier of fact decides whether to impose a sentence of death.6
Because it is the defendant who risks the penalty of death and not
counsel, the imposition of counsel on an unwilling defendant is
contradictory to the spirit of Faretta.
The right of the individual to proceed pro per in the penalty
phase of a capital case has been addressed and recognized by the
courts in seven states.67 Several of these decisions are summarized
here.
In People v. Silagy,68 the defendant waived counsel during the
sentencing hearing of a capital case and represented himself. He
presented no mitigating evidence and was sentenced to death.6 9
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant's
waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary and subsequently
affirmed the judgment. 0
In Smith v. State,7' the Florida Supreme Court resolved this
issue by holding that a defendant has the right to waive represen-
tation by counsel at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. The
court noted that "[p]araphrasing the opinion in Faretta, we need
make no assessment of how well or poorly appellant mastered the
intricacies of the sentencing process, for his technical legal knowl-
edge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing
exercise of the right to defend himself. 7 2 The court held that the
defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. It
further held that the trial court properly allowed the defendant to
represent himself at his sentencing hearing. 3
In State v. Harding,74 the defendant chose to represent himself
in both the guilt and sentencing phase of his capital case and was
convicted of first degree murder, robbery and kidnapping.75 The
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (1985).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 670 P.2d 383 (1983); Smith v. State,
407 So. 2d 894 (1981); People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 461 N.E.2d 415 (1984);
Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580 (1986); Pruett v. Thigpen, 444 So. 2d 819
(1984); Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d 273 (1979); State v. Brown, 347 S.E.2d
882 (1986).
68. 101 III.2d 147, 461 N.E.2d 415 (1984).
69. Id. at 178, 461 N.E.2d at 430.
70. Id. at 180-84, 461 N.E.2d at 432-33.
71. 407 So. 2d 894 (1981).
72. Id. at 900.
73. Id.
74. 137 Ariz. 278, 670 P.2d 383 (1983).
75. Id. at 284, 670 P.2d at 389.
1988]
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defendant declined to present any mitigating evidence at his sen-
tencing hearing and the trial court found no mitigating factors to
outweigh the aggravating factors.7 6 Subsequently, the court sen-
tenced the defendant to death.77 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his right to counsel.78
The question of whether a defendant has the right to proceed in
pro per, in the penalty phase of a capital case has not yet been
resolved in California. 9
In People v. Teron,80 the defendant represented himself at both
the guilt and penalty phase of his trial"' and chose not to intro-
duce any mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. 2 The
court did not have to reach the issue of pro per representation in
the penalty phase to decide the case because the crime was com-
mitted prior to the effective date of the death penalty legislation.
However, the court did note that the decision to permit a defend-
ant to represent himself in the penalty phase "presents additional
considerations not present at the guilt phase." 83 The court held
only that the trial court did not err in permitting the defendant to
represent himself at the guilt phase of his trial.84
This Comment argues that California should follow the lead of
those states which have properly resolved this issue in favor of
recognizing the right of a defendant to proceed pro per in both the
guilt and penalty phases of a capital case.
76. Id.
76. Id.
78. Id. at 287, 670 P.2d at 392.
79. The court has recognized, without resolving, the issue of pro per representation
in a death penalty hearing. People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 115, n.7, 588 P.2d 733, 779
n.7 151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 n.7 (1979).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 109-11, 588 P.2d at 775-77, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 635-37.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 115 n.7, 588 P.2d at 779, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 639. In Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d
936, 948-50, 671 P.2d 843, 850-52, 196 Cal. Rptr. 339, 346-48, Justice Mosk argued that
the defendant's right to self-representation is not unlimited. Since a defendant cannot plead
guilty and abandon his appeal rights directly, he should not be allowed to do so indirectly
by an inept performance. Id. This argument presumes that the court has some way of
knowing when a defendant's decision is a tactical one and when it is not. This Comment
suggests that the court cannot know that a defendant is subverting the system through an
inept performance unless the defendant informs the court that this is his motive. At that
point, his right to self-representation should be terminated. See supra note 38. To suggest
that the defendant's right to self representation should be ended because his tactics will
likely result in his conviction violates the very core of the Faretta decision. In Faretta, the
Court realized that a pro per defendant places himself at a great disadvantage, but noted
that "although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice
must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law."
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
350-51 (1970).
84. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d at 112-15, 588 P.2d at 776-79, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 637-40.
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IV. SHOULD A DEFENDANT PROCEEDING In Propria Persona
BE REQUIRED TO PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE DURING THE
PENALTY PHASE?
The right to make tactical85 decisions86 is included in the right
to self-representation. Unless the defendant expressly tells the
court that he refuses to present mitigating evidence because he
wishes to subvert the judicial system, or that he just wants to be
put to death, his decision may be a tactical one.
Should the court presume that a poor decision was not a tacti-
cal decision? This approach would violate the heart of Faretta,
which recognized that only in rare instances would a pro per de-
fendant present his case as effectively, or more effectively than if
he had counsel.8 With this recognition, however, came the
Court's declaration that "[p]ersonal liberties are not rooted in the
law of averages."88 The right to defend oneself is personal, and
even if the decision of a defendant not to present evidence turns
out to be a poor one, it remains his decision. 9
The pro per defendant, untrained in the law, cannot be ex-
pected to present his case with the expertise of a lawyer. Although
appearances may indicate that the defendant is presenting no de-
fense at all in the hope of receiving the death penalty, it may in
fact be a tactic designed to present the defendant as remorseful.
The court cannot look into the mind of a defendant and discern
what he is thinking.
Ill-conceived as his tactics may be, the defendant has the right
to pursue the strategy he deems best,90 the "right to act pro se...
is a right arising out of the Federal Constitution not the mere
product of legislation or judicial decision." 91
Even if the defendant will likely lose the case, he has the
right-as he suffers whatever consequences there may be-to
the knowledge that it was the claim that he put forward that
was considered and rejected, and to the knowledge that in our
free society, devoted to the ideal of individual worth, he was not
deprived of his free will to make his own choice, in his hour of
trial, to handle his own case. 2
85. A tactic is a device for accomplishing an end, that is, designed to achieve a given
purpose. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971).
86. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168
(1984); People v. Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d 936, 671 P.2d 843, 196 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1983).
87. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 190 S.E.2d 164 (1972).
92. Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d at 946, 671 P.2d at 849, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (1983)(quot-
ing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (1972)).
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This Comment argues that actions of a defendant proceeding pro
per must be presumed to be tactical in nature.
Where standby counsel has been appointed by the trial court it
is likely that counsel will disagree with the defendant's wish to
refrain from presenting mitigating evidence in the penalty phase
of his trial. Counsel will therefore request to present evidence over
the defendant's objections. This issue was addressed by the Ne-
vada Supreme Court. In Bishop v. State,93 a pro per defendant
presented no evidence in mitigation during the penalty phase. 94
Standby counsel informed the court that there was mitigating evi-
dence which could be presented, but that defendant refused to al-
low its introduction. 5 The evidence was not received and the de-
fendant was sentenced to death.96
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the sentencing
tribunal did not err when it did not delve into the mitigating evi-
dence alluded to by standby counsel.97 The right of the accused to
act as his own counsel carries with it the right to make the usual
choices concerning tactics and strategy.98 Allowing standby coun-
sel to present mitigating evidence over the objections of the de-
fendant would be an unconstitutional interference with the de-
fendant's right to self-representation.99
The California Supreme Court has described the right to pro-
ceed pro per as the right which ensures that a defendant will not
be "deprived of his free will to make his own choice, in his hour of
trial, to handle his own case."100 The logical interpretation of that
right allows that when the defendant makes a tactical decision not
to present mitigating evidence, the sixth amendment right to self-
representation requires that the state accept his decision.
In Deere, Justice Broussard in his concurring opinion, wrote
that respect must be shown to both the state's need to assure fair-
ness and reliability of the penalty determination, and the defend-
ant's rights to personal choice and dignity.101 A defendant may
93. 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d 273 (1979).
94. Id. at 515, 597 P.2d at 275.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 517, 597 P.2d at 276.
98. Id. at 518, 597 P.2d at 277. In a recent case dealing with ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the mere failure to present mitigating evi-
dence at the penalty phase of a capital trial does not in itself establish ineffective assistance
of counsel or deprivation of the accused's right to a fair trial, "as such omission, in appro-
priate case, could be in response to demands of accused or result of tactical, informed
decision of counsel." State v. Johnson, 24 Ohio St. 3d 87, 494 N.E. 2d 1061 (1986).
99. Bishop, 95 Nev. at 518, 597 P.2d at, 277.
100. People v. Joseph, 34 Cal. 3d 936, 946, 671 P.2d at 849, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 345
(1983).
101. Id. at 369-70, 710 P.2d at 934-35, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
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rationally feel that the comparative advantage of life imprison-
ment is not worth the humiliation and loss of dignity concomitant
with the presentation of mitigating evidence.102 In addition, re-
quiring counsel to present mitigating evidence over the express
wishes of the defendant presents a troubling picture.103 The confi-
dential relationship between client and counsel could be violated if
counsel was forced to take a position against his client. 04
Justice Broussard's concurring opinion suggested that counsel
might be allowed to inform the jury of the defendant's personal
position or that the defendant address the jury himself.10 5 He also
suggested that the court could call persons with mitigating evi-
dence as its own witnesses. 0 or appoint new counsel to call these
witnesses. 0 7 The majority dismissed the last two suggestions as
impractical. 0 The court also noted that it would be unprece-
dented to allow the defendant to be able to address the jury when
he has counsel.'0 9 Because of this conflict, a means is needed by
which the state's interest in a reliable penalty determination is
protected, without sacrificing the individual's right to self-
representation.
V. A SOLUTION PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE
In order to solve the pro per representation problem, a pre-sen-
tencing report should be included in all capital cases as part of the
mandatory appellate process. This report would contain all state-
ments made on behalf of a defendant by those wishing to make
them. Thus, in a case where a defendant is represented by counsel
and the defendant does not want family and friends parading in
front of him, depriving him of whatever dignity remains, this re-
port can be introduced as mitigating evidence.
At present, in California, there is no requirement that a trial
court refer a case to the probation officer for presentence investi-
gation when there is no chance for probation." 0 Once this report
is made mandatory, the probation officer would also automatically
102. Id. at 369, 710 P.2d at 934, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
103. Id. at 369, 710 P.2d at 935, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 368, 710 P.2d at 934, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
109. Id. at 368, 710 P.2d at 933, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
110. CAL. R. CT. 418. Rule 418 provides: "Regardless of the defendant's eligibility
for probation, the sentencing judge should refer the matter to the probation officer for a
presentence investigation." Note that the word 'should' is advisory, as per CAL R. CT. 407.
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undertake an investigation. This would involve collecting informa-
tion, such as written statements from interested people, including
family members, who wish to speak on behalf of the defendant."'
Where the defendant is represented by counsel, the report
would be made available to the trial court when the defendant
insists that mitigating evidence in the nature of testimony by wit-
nesses would be too embarrassing to him and strip him of the last
vestige of dignity. In a case such as this, Justice Broussard's sug-
gestion that counsel inform the jury of the defendant's personal
position would be appropriate, and the jury would then review the
report.11 2 Thus, the record contains that evidence necessary to de-
termine the appropriateness of the penalty, and the dignity of the
defendant is preserved.
Where a defendant is proceeding pro per, or pro per with
standby counsel, this report should be made available on appeal
only. This will ensure that the defendant's actual control with re-
gard to tactical decision making is protected."' If a defendant
would choose not to present any mitigating evidence during the
penalty phase and received a sentence of death, the pre-sentence
report would mandatorily be reviewed by the state supreme court.
This Comment suggests that the court would then determine
whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would
have been different if the trial court had been aware of the con-
tents of the report."14 If the court so finds, then the case would be
remanded for a new finding as to the penalty. Where the defend-
ant chooses not to present any evidence at the guilt and penalty
phase, and received the death penalty, then this report will provide
the necessary evidence for a determination by the California Su-
preme Court.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between the individual's right to self-representation
and the interest of the state in the penalty phase of a capital case
demands resolution. The state interest in a more complete record
cannot and should not take precedence over the sixth amendment
right to self-representation. Deciding whether mitigating evidence
should be presented in the penalty phase of a capital case is a
I 11. CAL. R. CT. 419 (7) (ii).
112. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d at 369, 710 P.2d at 935, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 24, The prosecu-
tion would then have the opportunity to rebut the information contained in the report, thus
ensuring a balanced presentation.
113. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
114. This test is adopted from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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tactical decision.115 A defendant proceeding pro per in a capital
case does not have control over tactical decisions if the state re-
quires him to present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of
his trial. Making a pro per defendant present mitigating evidence
amounts to a usurpation of his sixth amendment right to self-rep-
resentation. The result is that the defense presented in such a case
is the state's, not that of the defendant.
The solution is a mandatory pre-sentence report. This will sat-
isfy the state's need for a more complete record. The use of this
report will reduce the chance of mistaken judgments and provide
a means to determine the appropriateness of the penalty, without
diluting the integrity of the individual's sixth amendment right to
self-representation.
John D. Williams*
115. Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 518 597 P.2d 273, 277 (1979).
* Special thanks to my wife, Diane, and our children, Lisa and John Brian, for their
love and support; and to Professor Lawrence A. Benner, Professor California Western
School of Law, for his insight and friendship.
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